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Professor Charles Lofgren is one of the best contemporary stu-
dents of American constitutional history, and especially of the re-
spective powers of the president and Congress in the field of foreign 
affairs. His new book, which draws its title from Hamilton in the 
first Federalist paper, includes six of his major articles on these 
themes published during the last twenty years. It is important to 
have the articles conveniently available. They belong on the short 
shelf of thoughtful and disciplined scholarly work in a field notable 
for passion, polemics, and extravagant disregard of the evidence. 
Lofgren's craftsmanship is meticulous, but his outlook has two 
blind spots. The first is jurisprudential: he exaggerates the role of 
"original intent" in the growth of law, the subject of at least four of 
his chapters. The second is a defect of formation: he seems to have 
little familiarity with international law, a weakness which particu-
larly affects Chapter 5, his well-known essay on United States v. 
Curtiss-Wright Export Corporation.3 
This review will focus mainly on these two aspects of Lofgren's 
work. 
I 
As an expositor of "original intent," Lofgren is not an unso-
phisticated Luddite, professing the kind of fundamentalism so 
characteristic of Justice Black in his moments of transcendent con-
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stitutional piety. On the contrary, his credo, stated in Chapter 3, is 
in itself unexceptionable: 
As Justice Holmes reminded us, "when we are dealing with words that are also a 
constituent act ... we must realize that they have called into life a being the devel-
opment of which could not have been foreseen by the most gifted of its begetters." 
"Our whole experience," he cautioned, needs consideration and "not merely" what 
was said during the founding period. Still, Holmes's choice of the phrase "not 
merely" is worth pondering. It suggests that one should at least take account of 
accurate history in fashioning constitutional arguments, even if that history is not 
fully dispositive of the issues in question. 
Thus Lofgren's formal conception of his task as historian is a 
limited one: to provide the lawyer and legal scholar with an "accu-
rate" version of the lawmakers' "original understanding" of what 
they were doing. But "the original understanding" of the lawmaker 
in Lofgren's sense of the term can never be revealed only or even 
mainly by a review of "what was said during the founding period." 
What was done or taken for granted as super- obvious, then or im-
mediately thereafter, is often quite as significant as the words one or 
another of the diarists may have written. Nor can "the original un-
derstanding" conjured up by Lofgren's method ever be "fully dis-
positive" of an issue in controversy, to emphasize his revealing 
phrase. It is at most one strand and not necessarily the most impor-
tant strand in the endless process through which a society's ideal of 
justice responds to its customs and mores to produce its living law. 
Lofgren's conception of law is far too static. How, for example, 
would it apply to the electoral college? The "original understand-
ing" of the Founding Fathers is reasonably clear. Have we been 
electing presidents unconstitutionally since 1788? 
Even if one should concede, as I cannot, that the historian's 
task is in some sense different from that of the lawyer and legal 
scholar, Lofgren casts too narrow a net. His attention is directed 
almost exclusively to the records of the Constitutional Convention, 
The Federalist Papers and other documents of the controversy over 
the ratification of the Constitution, and some other early commen-
taries. But reading the Constitution, like reading any other law, or 
indeed like any other reading, requires a wider view. Words come 
to us with the baggage of life. 
The Founding Fathers thought their Constitution should speak 
for itself. They did not publish their austere official journal and 
frowned on the publication of private records. The official journal 
was not published until 1819, and Madison's Notes were issued in 
1840. Madison's Notes and the other direct and indirect evidence of 
what was said during the debates are fragmentary at best, and often 
misleading. The documentation of the debates in the state ratifying 
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conventions is even less satisfactory.4 
In general, there is the perennial and insoluble problem of how 
the "intentions" of the thirty-eight men who signed the Constitu-
tion and the several hundred who voted for ratification in the state 
conventions could be inferred from the reported language of the few 
who spoke or wrote on each issue, even if verbatim transcripts of 
their words existed. The Federalist Papers, magnificent as they are 
as an exposition of political philosophy, were exercises in advocacy. 
They were written in large part to allay the fears of those who saw 
the Constitution as an engine of tyranny, the source of an oppres-
sive national government. It is hardly surprising that The Federalist 
Papers did not fully prepare public opinion for the robust national 
institutions which developed as the Constitution was tested and ap-
plied in the crucible of experience. 
These and cognate problems in discerning "the original under-
standing" of any particular part of the Constitution, or of the 
Constitution as a whole, are secondary, however. To interpret the 
Constitution in its full context requires much more than conscien-
tiously poring over the documentary record, such as it is. In itself 
archival research would be misleading and inadequate even if the 
records were rich and complete. 
First of all, it is intellectually impossible for people of the twen-
tieth century to discover "the original intent" of their eighteenth 
century forefathers in any detail. American civilization in the late 
twentieth century is visibly derived from that of the seventeenth and 
eighteenth centuries, and tightly linked to it. During the last two 
centuries, however, there have been many changes in the intellec-
tual and moral universe of American life, some of fundamental im-
portance: in attitudes toward religion, for example, race, the 
treatment of women, poverty, and many other subjects. The role of 
the United States in world politics has been transformed by its own 
growth and other changes in the world balance of power. As a re-
sult, the problem of American national security is completely differ-
ent from that which confronted the United States government 
between 1789 and the years immediately before the First World 
War, and the inherent friction between the president and Congress 
has been correspondingly intensified. The landscape of American 
life is different; the relationship of ideas and problems to each other 
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is different. Moreover, the modern scholar inevitably approaches 
the historical record with the preoccupations of his own period in 
mind, whereas those of his ancestors usually turn out to have been 
quite different. No one can successfully put himself in the shoes of 
Madison or Hamilton, Jefferson or Washington. And even if a 
scholar of super-human imagination succeeded in doing so, the re-
sult might well be disappointing. As Lofgren notes, "Madison and 
Hamilton, who presumably knew something about the original in-
tent, came to contradictory conclusions" about the respective pow-
ers of the president and Congress in the field of war and foreign 
relations within four years of the ratification. The twentieth cen-
tury scholar can hardly hope to achieve a better footing. 
What survives of the Constitution, and retains its full vitality, 
is not "the original understanding" of the Founding Fathers about 
this or that detail, but its constitutional character and its constitu-
tional purpose: its basic structure, on the one hand, and its animat-
ing policies, on the other, what Montesquieu called "the spirit of the 
laws," their shaping aspirations. Marshall's famous sentence-"We 
must never forget that it is a constitution we are expounding"s-is 
the most important sentence he ever wrote. It sums up a jurispru-
dence of the utmost subtlety and sophistication which, so far as I 
know, has never been examined in philosophical terms. Marshall's 
thesis is that a constitution should not be a "prolix code" but a 
short, simple, general document which citizens can understand as 
the guaranty of their rights for ages to come. It is an "outline," 
Marshall said, and is not intended to anticipate and settle every 
question but necessarily leaves much to the discretion of future gov-
ernments. The American Constitution, he made clear, should be 
construed as a whole, not bit by bit, and construed moreover in its 
full matrix of cultural history. Its construction should have con-
tinuity as well as flexibility. The Constitution should be faithful to 
its broad principles and purposes yet capable of adaptation to the 
changing circumstances of the American experience. 
Marshall's greatest opinions illustrate the distinction between 
purposes and values, on the one hand, and detail on the other. He 
almost never starts with the language of a particular clause of the 
Constitution. His major premise is drawn from something Marshall 
calls "the Grand Design" or "the fundamental principles" of "the 
American polity." After he has formulated and discussed those 
principles, and applied them to the case before him, he drily com-
ments that no language in the Constitution precludes the Court's 
5. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 407 (1819). 
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conclusion or its reasoning.6 
What were the broad purposes on which the Marshallian Con-
stitution rests? Among those he emphasized in particular cases 
were establishing a government of laws and not of men; balancing 
the authority of the one and the many, the nation and the states; 
and giving the new national institutions ample elbow room to carry 
out their essential functions, while holding them to high standards 
of democratic responsibility. We can be confident, for example, 
that the Founding Fathers thought that the absence of an executive 
was one of the great weaknesses of the American government under 
the Articles of Confederation, and that they sought to establish a 
strong, energetic president as an independent branch of govern-
ment, a president who was definitely not a prime minister, but 
would be democratically accountable in appropriate cases to 
the people, to Congress, or to the courts. Even this highly genera-
lized sentence probes the limits of "the original understanding." 
Madison, one of the most active and important participants in the 
Constitutional Convention, resisted the idea that the secretary of 
state could be summoned before a courtJ And as Lofgren con-
cedes, we cannot be sure that the signers of the Constitution 
thought they were requiring a congressional vote before the presi-
dent could order the armed forces to do anything more than repel a 
sudden attack on the United States itself.s 
II 
Lofgren's weakness in international law appears most conspic-
uously in Chapter 5. In attempting to evaluate Justice Sutherland's 
opinion in Curtiss- Wright, he assembles twenty pages of material 
drawn from Farrand, the reports of the state ratifying conventions, 
the controversy over Jay's Treaty of 1794, and other contemporary 
sources in order to clarify what kind of sovereignty the Founding 
Fathers thought the government of the United States possessed 
before and after 1776, and whether that sovereignty was derived 
from the British Crown, the people of the United States, or the Con-
6. See Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) I, 17 (1824); McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 
U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316,405 (1819); Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137, 166 (1803). 
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stitution. The international law view is the one element of the prob-
lem not mentioned in Lofgren's painstaking array of what a number 
of people said on the subject at the time. But the international law 
dimension of the problem is decisive. 
States are born and come into being by international agreement 
or by war. Statehood is a question of "fact," the international law-
yers say. States have territories, governments, armies, police forces, 
postal services, and the other accoutrements of statehood. Diplo-
matic recognition is the political and legal mechanism through 
which the international community or a considerable number of its 
leading members acknowledges that a state exists and is endowed 
with "sovereignty" for purposes of international law. 
The Constitution does not purport to confer sovereignty on the 
United States. On the contrary, from the first words of the pream-
ble to the end, it treats the United States as an ongoing (and sover-
eign) political entity, whose government was being replaced by the 
new successor government provided for in the Constitution of 1787, 
a government created by the sovereign people of the United States, 
not by the states, and one which acknowledged the debts of the two 
previous American governments and the treaties they had made. 
The United States of America became a sovereign state when it was 
generally recognized as such during and after the Revolutionary 
War, first by France and then by other European states. Because 
we (and France) won the Revolutionary War, sovereignty is deemed 
to have vested at least by the time the Continental Congress, which 
was already conducting a war, declared the independence of the 
United States in 1776. The Confederacy, by contrast, is considered 
never to have existed, at least in American constitutional law. 
The Americans were intimately familiar with the significance 
of recognition in international law. One has only to glance at the 
instructions of our diplomatic missions during the Revolution to 
realize that obtaining diplomatic recognition in Europe was a cen-
tral and urgent goal of United States foreign policy at the time. 
The Constitution thus recognizes that by reason of its estab-
lishment and recognition, the United States possesses all the powers 
other states possess under international law. It divides those pow-
ers between the president and Congress, Congress being granted the 
legislative authority and the president, the executive. All that Cur-
tiss- Wright says and decides is that Congress may "delegate" some 
of its discretion in "the broad external realm" to the president, and 
that the constitutional standards governing congressional delega-
tions of power to the president in the area of foreign affairs may be 
different from those thought to prevail in other areas, in view of the 
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president's independent power as the nation's representative 
abroad. 
Lofgren claims to have demolished the legitimacy of Curtiss-
Wright. He did not succeed. 
In Chapter 1, Lofgren's influential paper, War-Making Under 
the Constitution: The Original Understanding, he briefly reviews the 
international law treatises and practice of the times, and recognizes 
that "declared" or "unlimited" and "undeclared," "limited," or 
"imperfect" wars were familiar categories of international law, as 
common in the usage and doctrine of the period as they are now. 
He then confronts the question of what article I, section 8 of the 
Constitution meant when it conferred on Congress only the power 
to "declare" war. 
Hamilton's Pacificus papers, to which Lofgren briefly refers, 
would treat Congress's power to declare war as an exception to the 
general power of the nation under international law to undertake 
hostilities in times of peace or of war. Hamilton characterizes this 
national power as executive in character, and contends that the 
power to declare war, as an exception to a more general power, 
should be confined to its express terms-i.e., that the president was 
given the constitutional power to initiate all forms of war known to 
international law except fully declared, notorious, and unlimited 
war. Congress has the last word on the subject, but the president 
can act first, as many presidents have acted since Washington's first 
term. 
Lofgren dismisses Hamilton's view in uncharacteristically 
summary terms. It seems "improbable," he says, that a contempo-
rary would have accepted the view that the power to initiate un-
declared war was "lodged with the executive." Since Hamilton was 
a knowledgeable contemporary, and wrote the Pacificus papers, it is 
hard to see the basis for Lofgren's conclusion. At the time and 
since, Hamilton's Pacificus papers have been considered far more 
persuasive than Madison's half-hearted attempt to answer them. 
Corwin, the outstanding modern scholar on the subject, accepted 
Hamilton's opinion, not Madison's. Corwin's treatment of the is-
sues is not discussed or even cited by Lofgren.9 Moreover, Wash-
ington followed Hamilton's advice, and so did every president 
thereafter, with Congress's support or acquiescence. 
Lofgren attempts to reinforce his conclusion by a strained in-
terpretation of international law usage with regard to letters of mar-
que and reprisal. He suggests that Congress's authority to issue 
9. E. CORWIN, THE PRESIDENT: OFFICE AND POWERS, 1787-1957 (4th ed. 1957); E. 
CORWIN, THE PRESIDENT'S CONTROL OF FOREIGN RELATIONS (1917). 
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letters of marque and reprisal under article I, section 8 is in all 
probability a grant of exclusive authority to authorize all forms of 
warfare not conducted pursuant to a declaration of war. This is a 
far-fetched argument, as Lofgren tacitly acknowledges by calling 
for "a more detailed consideration" of the subject. The practice of 
issuing letters of marque and reprisal was ended by treaty in the 
middle of the nineteenth century. 
III 
Professor Lofgren's studies are and will remain useful re-
sources for lawyers and legal scholars, but their utility is limited by 
the narrowness of their historiographical and jurisprudential foun-
dation, and by the fact that even Lofgren is occasionally tempted to 
go beyond the evidence. In the heat of battle on the significance of 
the fact that the Constitution grants Congress the power to "de-
clare" war, for example, his reasoning approaches the level of wish-
ful thinking. 
But the basic trouble with Lofgren's method is its preoccupa-
tion with what was said, and especially with what was said during 
the early years under the Constitution, rather than with what was 
done. The living constitution, the constitution with a small "c," is 
(like all law) the pattern of behavior the society deems right, in this 
case the pattern of governmental behavior viewed through the 
prism of our constitutional values and our constitutional history. 
The interaction of custom, necessity, and the prescribed law some-
times produces interesting results. Thus Jefferson, confronted with 
the Louisiana Purchase, concluded that the United States, like 
every other state, could acquire territory by treaty, and would not 
have to pass a constitutional amendment, as he had previously 
thought would be required. And the most important and construc-
tive achievement of Nixon's presidency was his secret warning to 
the Soviet Union not to bomb the Chinese nuclear plants, a warning 
which in the nature of things would have been ineffective if it had 
been made public at the time, authorized by statute, or even re-
vealed to congressional leaders through the mysterious process 
called "consultation." The "original understanding" was that the 
president should be capable of "energy, secrecy, and dispatch," as 
Hamilton put it. That constitutional goal necessarily prevails over 
the language that the Founding Fathers may have used at the time. 
